



Submission to the Transport Select Committee inquiry into the Public Private Partnership on London Underground (Update)

1 Introduction:

London TravelWatch is the official body set up by Parliament to provide a voice for London's travelling public, including the users of all forms of public transport. Our role is to:

- Speak up for transport users in discussions with policy-makers and the media;
- Consult with the transport industry, its regulators and funders on matters affecting users;
- Investigate complaints users have been unable to resolve with service providers, and;
- Monitor trends in service quality.

Our aim is to press in all that we do for a better travel experience all those living, working or visiting London and its surrounding region.

2 The Inquiry

London TravelWatch welcomes the House of Commons Transport Committee's further inquiry, which will build on its previous work, and will consider:

- Whether the lessons learned from the collapse of the Metronet PPP consortium have been applied to the Tube Lines PPP?
- How the upgrades are progressing?
- What contractual arrangements are appropriate for the future?
- What risks are associated with the PPP arrangements with Tube Lines?
- What impact is the current economic situation having on transport PPP and PFI schemes and what are the financial implications for other transport schemes?
- What role has the Government played in these matters?

Recently, we have worked closely with the London Assembly Transport Committee on this issue, and attached as Appendix A is our written evidence to them.

3 General principles of the PPP

In general terms Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are typically characterised by the following features:

- Long term relationship between the public sector and a private partner for the delivery of a project, typically contracts are between 15 to 30 years;
- Funding is provided by the private partner, however some level of public funding may be included to complete the funding requirements of the project;

- The private partner is typically involved in all levels of delivery of the project the objectives of which have been defined by the public sector, and;
- A transfer of risk takes place from the public to the private sector. This does not mean that the public sector is left without risk, but much of the risk associated with a portion of the financing, the delivery and operation of the project would typically be transferred. The actual distribution of the risk is dependent on the ability of each party to be able influence and control the risk. The public sector will therefore retain a substantial amount of risk over which it retains control.

Examples of retained risk might include:

- Changes in scope of the project;
- Changes in the law;
- Force majeure, and;
- Indemnities for specific issues such as existing asset conditions.

Globally PPPs can vary substantially within these broad features and even within the UK a wide variety of structures can be observed.

As previously submitted to this committee, London TravelWatch supports the objective of the London Underground PPP to guarantee the flow of investment into the Underground, after many years of inconsistency and fluctuation. We consider it of the utmost importance that the periodic reviews at 7.5 year intervals should not be allowed to become vehicles for under-funded price rises and for the scope of investment plans to be cancelled or reduced in scope. This concern is given added importance by the slippage that has occurred in parts of the investment schedule, and by Metronet going into administration, each of which phenomena increases the opportunity for cuts to be made in previously agreed investment programmes.

We were initially concerned that animosity to the principle of the PPP would adversely affect relationships between London Underground (LU) and the PPP contractors. We are therefore encouraged by the determination of LU's top management to work constructively for the success of the PPP in the interests of Underground users, whatever may have been the political debate over its introduction.

We are, however, concerned that - despite assurances that the Infrastructure Companies (Tube Lines and Metronet) would get on top of the problems, once the period of climbing the 'learning curve' had passed - placing contracts for looking after 70% of the LU network with a single organisation was too much. Tube Lines, with only 30% of the business, has shown itself to be more capable of delivering projects on time and to budget, although its slowness to rise to the challenge of improving performance on the Northern line has been disappointing'.

However, we are now somewhat alarmed by the increasing number of weekend engineering possessions being required on the Jubilee line in recent months, and about how the upgrade of the Piccadilly line will take place particularly on the central London section of route. We submitted evidence to the London Assembly Transport Committee scrutiny of this issue and this we attach as appendix A to this submission. We believe that whilst passengers are willing to accept some measure of 'pain', provided that they are informed about alterations to their services well in advance and can plan accordingly, when these are then supplemented by short notice additional closures for example, passengers' patience can be severely tested. This is particularly important when passengers may be making leisure journeys (say to the O2 arena) or to places of employment which require attendance at weekends.

4 Lessons learned from the collapse of Metronet and progress of the upgrade work subsequently?

As we highlighted in previous submissions the structure of the Metronet PPP and its modes of operation were complex and in many cases did not deliver value for money for the taxpayer or the standard of service expected for the passenger. We believe that in the case of Metronet, now under the control of London Underground, there have been substantial changes in working and accounting practices since the takeover of Metronet that have produced substantial cost savings and increased overall efficiency.

The structure of the Tube Lines PPP shares much in common with the Metronet PPP, but the characteristics of the Tube Lines are fundamentally different in respect of their supply chains. The principal lessons of the Metronet collapse that are applicable directly to Tube Lines are:

- A proactive management of PPP risk by the public sector, and;
- Formal recourse to the PPP Arbiter in assessing costs.

5 What contractual arrangements are appropriate for the future?

London TravelWatch strongly advocates for the contractual arrangements which balance the least disruption and greatest benefits to passengers. In the shorter term changing the contractual arrangements are likely to result in disruption which would not be in the interests of passengers. In the longer term consideration should be given as to whether PPP is the best means to deliver infrastructure maintenance and enhancements to London Underground's network. The collapse of Metronet has illustrated the complexity and costs incurred when PPP structures are not successful. It also illustrates that in reality it is challenging to achieve genuine risk transferral.

As an example of the high costs of PPP/PFI projects, the Intercity Express Project incurred £14.95 million of consultancy fees¹ up to March 2009. The complexity of the PPP/PFI structure and the tendency to develop bespoke structures for each deal means that the advisory costs to the public sector are high. These costs have to be recovered by private sector efficiencies. The reality of the efficiency gains are hard to establish given that the life time of a typical PPP of 30 years.

6 What risks are associated with the PPP arrangements with Tube Lines?

The principal risks associated with the PPP arrangements with Tube Lines for passengers are programme overruns. As an example London Underground informed London TravelWatch of additional closures of the Jubilee Line on the weekend of the 26th to 27th September and 3rd to 4th October in order to allow Tube Lines more engineering access to meet their programmed deadlines for the Jubilee Line signalling upgrade. Line closures are disruptive to passengers at the best of times, but the unplanned closures were announced with minimal warning to passengers on the 23rd September 3 days prior to the first altered closure date. It would also appear from

¹ Page 43, Modern Railways, August 2009

recent press statements that Tube Lines, despite additional line closures, is unlikely to be able to deliver the Jubilee upgrade on time.

There are also risks related to the continued disagreement between London Underground and Tube Lines over the restated terms. London TravelWatch urges both sides to come to an agreement over the Tube Lines PPP programme that is in the interest of passengers. This means ensuring that the full planned upgrades are carried out on time and at a cost which means that passengers are not penalised with higher fares.

7 What impact is the current economic situation having on transport PPP and PFI schemes and what are the financial implications for other transport schemes?

PPP/PFI is dependent on the availability of credit to the private sector in order to raise debt to finance projects. The impact of the current economic climate has been to reduce the availability of credit and to decrease the appetite for risk. Increased equity investment may also be required from PPP bidders by commercial lenders. For upcoming transport PPP/PFI deals in the UK transport market the consequences are to potentially reduce the number of bidders as well to increase the cost of finance. Bidders may also find it difficult to make definitive quotes for costs which are dependent on sub-contracts or supply chains. The result is that at the bid submission all bidders' offers are likely to be higher over the whole life costing to cover that risk and the cost of finance..

The UK is a mature PPP/PFI market with well established legal and contractual structures. Transport is one of the most long established sectors for PPP/PFI in the UK with historically the largest cumulative volume of deals. However, many of the factors effecting PPP/PFI are global because of the debt finance requirements and also because many of the bidders are global companies.

The Treasury has set up the Treasury Infrastructure Finance Unit (TIFU) in an attempt to provide liquidity to this market both for upcoming projects and for existing providers. In the Treasury's view, *"it is unlikely that private sector lending will be sufficient to deliver the scheduled pipeline of projects even taking account of increased lending activity by the EIB."*² This action by the Treasury may address the immediate issue as a last resort, but the involvement of the Treasury in providing debt finance calls into question part of the logic of private sector involvement in public sector procurement.

Historically Transport has made up the largest element of the PPP/PFI market in the UK. However, the volume of transport PPP/PFIs have reduced substantially and no deals took place in 2008. Of the current transport projects in procurement, the Intercity Express Project and Thameslink Rolling Stock Project both involve providing financing for the rolling stock to be procured. They are therefore considerably impacted by the economic conditions. It is notable that of a number of recent transport procurement projects (not all PPP/PFI related) that either planned bid submission dates have been delayed or bidders have been invited to revise certain assumptions. This suggests that the public sector is likely to have to shoulder a greater portion of the risk of PPP/PFI projects. Bidders' are likely to ask for greater guarantees and conditions which would reduce the overall risk transfer to the PPP provider. The value for money that is

² http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ppp_tifu_letter_050509.pdf

achieved by the public sector from PPP/PFI is therefore also likely to be reduced. This could lead to either greater cost to tax payers and the travelling public, or to a more limited scope of investment.

8 What role has the Government played in these matters?

Given the contractual structure between TfL and the Infrastructure Companies the direct involvement of the Government has not been significant. This is because the DfT had no direct controls over the risks associated with the PPP. The NAO report into Metronet identifies this key issue.

In the demise of Metronet, TfL has been left in the position of control over Metronet's former activities. The fixed grant settlement for TfL has not been revised in order to address this funding requirement going forwards. London TravelWatch urges Central Government to reconsider this position in order that passengers are not affected by:

1. Cost savings in the investment programme, and;
2. A rise in fares in order to recover additional expenditure costs.

9 Conclusions

London TravelWatch believes that the scale of the London Underground PPPs meant that they were always a challenging prospect to deliver. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the way in which it was carried out, it has attempted to tackle the historic problem that has faced London Underground and its passengers – namely the need for long term commitment to fund investment in the system. In common with other infrastructure operators LU's previous funding regime had been hampered by a stop-start cycle of capital funding governed by the fiscal requirements of the Government of the day.

London's transport users would be seriously disadvantaged if either the costs to LU of taking over the Metronet upgrade programme, or the current issues with Tube Lines restated terms, were to put in jeopardy the commitment to continuing investment that the PPP has sought to guarantee. We therefore urge that the interests of passengers are held as paramount in resolving the issues surrounding the restated terms and TfL's wider funding.

From the collapse of Metronet, there are lessons that can be learnt about the performance of the PPP which could lead to benefits for passengers, and we await the Select Committee's conclusions with interest.

Appendix A

London Assembly Transport Committee investigation into overcrowding on the Underground and impact of the upgrade programme – written evidence submission from London TravelWatch.

1. Introduction
 - 1.1 Thank you for the opportunity to submit evidence to your scrutiny meeting on the above subject. This is subject which has exercised London TravelWatch and it's predecessors for many years.
 - 1.2 This paper sets out London TravelWatch's view of overcrowding on the Underground and of the impact of the current upgrade programme on passengers. This has been informed by our appeals casework and our experience with both planned (East London Line) and unplanned (Chancery Lane Central Line) closures and also by our detailed involvement in forward planning to counter disruption arising from the Thameslink programme on the National Rail network.
2. Overcrowding on the Underground
 - 2.1 Crowding is of concern to passengers, and this is evident from London Underground's own customer satisfaction surveys indicate the train and station crowding (as well as the related area of train cleanliness) are the areas of most dissatisfaction amongst passengers.
 - 2.2 In general, however most passengers accept that some degree of crowding on the Underground is a fact of life, and that providing enough capacity for everyone to be seated at all times is just not practical or nor would it represent value for money. This is because passengers will in deciding to use the Underground make a decision which is based on a balance of comfort, speed, cost and a general expectation of the how journey will work out. In many cases the speed of the journey will be put above that of comfort or cost and they have a general expectation that it will be busy. However, passengers do expect that London Underground (LU) / Transport for London (TfL) should provide them with the means to mitigate or manage their experience of overcrowding. Primarily, this involves the provision of information to passengers. This might be at a macro level such as a journey planner which can suggest alternative less congested routes or at a micro level such as simple announcements at stations telling people to spread themselves along the platform or giving them advance intelligence that a following train is less crowded and that passengers could wait for that service. Information such as this gives passengers a sense of empowerment by enabling them to make decisions either before they commence their journey or during it.
 - 2.3 Passengers also expect LU / TfL to have in place a long term investment programme to address overcrowding issues and also to consider other measures which would assist in managing crowding issues. For example, there is a correlation between overcrowding and service reliability – if gaps develop in a service it is more likely that overcrowding will take place in busy areas. Therefore, addressing the reliability issue would also have the effect of dealing with overcrowding.
 - 2.3.1 The Public Private Partnership (PPP) was intended as the means by which LU would address crowding issues by investment. In addition works to improve the overall accessibility of the network through by providing step free access to key stations would have delivered substantial additional capacity at key locations. However, the well documented problems with the PPP and the cancellation of most uncommitted

schemes in the step free programme means that many of the schemes that would have provided such relief will either be delivered late, be deferred or cancelled.

2.3.2 The impact of the recession so far has been that LU has experienced a decline in usage in recent periods. However, as with growth such decline is not uniform and also may not be at times when overcrowding is an issue. For example, declining disposable income may result in fewer trips at off-peak times when capacity is available anyway. There is therefore not necessarily any relief at peak times of overcrowding. Lessons from previous recessions however, indicate that it is short sighted to rely on passenger numbers dropping to deliver relief from crowding, as often once a recovery (particularly of employment) takes place growth brings greater numbers of passengers than previously. It is therefore not wise, in our view to consider scaling back schemes which would deliver substantial additional capacity over the long term to deal with short term adverse economic circumstances.

2.3.3 There is also some evidence that the level of crowding on the Underground has the effect of suppressing demand. As we stated in our evidence on rail overcrowding :- *'for example in South London that there is substantive suppressed demand for travel at peak times, which may mean that passengers are using other modes such as car or bus to avoid crowding on the rail network. In addition trains either side of the peak – called the shoulder peak in industry terminology, have become substantially busier than previously as users themselves often make decisions to travel at different times for better comfort or lower fares'*. This is equally true of the Underground.

2.4 Use of fares policy to manage demand.

2.4.1 As we stated in our evidence on rail overcrowding:- *'perhaps one of the most controversial methods of attempting to control crowding issues has been the use of the price mechanism to incentivise passengers to travel at off peak times. This has been tried in various guises over the years with varying degrees of success. The most basic incentive is that for journeys after 0930 Monday to Friday an "Off-peak" fare for the day of travel is available, which is cheaper than an "Anytime" fare. Other schemes have included for example introducing restrictions on the use of off-peak tickets for longer distance journeys in the period between 1630 and 1900 on First Capital Connect and National Express East Anglia. The introduction of "Super off peak" fares after 1200 on South West Trains and Chiltern, Southeastern and c2c offering for a period 'early bird' season tickets only valid on trains arriving in London before a certain time (but these have now been withdrawn). These schemes have met with varying degrees of success, and have often been very unpopular with passenger, particularly if they have resulted in a significant increase in the price of their journey. The evening peak hour is significantly different from the morning because unlike in the morning it coincides with the peak of leisure traffic at 'going home time', whereas in the morning the peak time of departure for leisure traffic is significantly later than that for journeys to work or business. The Mayor is proposing to introduce from 2nd January 2009 a fares regime on all TfL rail modes a charging system based on higher fares between 0630 and 0930, 1600 and 1930 Monday to Friday than at other times. It is likely that National Rail services will also follow suit when Oyster is introduced to their network later in 2009 (actually January 2010 as at July 2009). London TravelWatch has expressed a view that the whilst the introduction of cheaper fares between 0930 and 1600 is welcome, the case for introducing an evening surcharge is less proven with little or no evidence that the introduction of such restrictions has made any significant material contribution to demand at these times. However, in the case of travel in the morning peak there is concern that the introduction of a 24 hour validity to Freedom Passes (for people with disabilities and those over 60) could increase overcrowding in the morning peak, because of the removal of the financial incentive not to travel at this time'*.

- 2.4.2 So far we have seen no evidence of an impact on overcrowding on use of cheaper fares on the London Underground between 0930 and 1600 on Mondays to Fridays.
- 2.4.3 It may be worth noting that the introduction of Oyster Pay As You Go on the National Rail network in January 2010 may have the effect of encouraging some passengers to transfer from the Underground to National Rail services where currently the cost and convenience advantages of Oyster have encouraged users to 'railhead' to the Underground in preference to using their local National Rail station. This may however, result in a worsening of overcrowding on the National Rail network and the overall effect on crowding on the Underground may be minimal.
- 2.5 Other means of alleviating overcrowding.
- 2.5.1 Unlike on the National Rail network, there are very few other measures where LU could make a direct impact on crowding levels which do not involve improving other modes or by making direct infrastructure improvements to the LU network. Completion of projects such as Thameslink, the East London Line and Crossrail will bring substantial relief to certain parts of the network, and other smaller projects will also help.
- 2.5.2 However for substantial proportions of the crowded network the only alternative would be to improve local bus services e.g. paralleling the Northern line between Clapham South and London Bridge / Bank / Moorgate, Highbury & Islington and Kings Cross / Euston / Oxford Circus, Kennington and Waterloo / Charing Cross, and London Bridge to Bermondsey / Canada Water / Canary Wharf. Alternatively, for very local journeys within central London it may be more sensible to consider enhancing pedestrian routes on the surface e.g. between Circle / District line stations between Embankment and Tower Hill, and Central / Piccadilly line stations between Leicester Square and Liverpool Street.
- 2.5.3 Better use of existing capacity on trains may also be possible by the use of additional seating on station platforms, more shelters on surface level station platforms and opening additional station entrances. These would encourage passengers to spread themselves along the lengths of trains better.
- 2.5.4 Longer trains. With the replacement of C class stock on the Circle / District / Hammersmith and City Lines all tube and sub-surface railways of London Underground will be operating at the maximum possible length of train without the need for massive capital investment in platform extensions. There are therefore no further possibilities for crowding relief by this means.
- 2.5.5 Better use of space within trains. During the 1990's London Underground did extensive research on how space within tube trains could be maximised for passenger use. This was known as the 'Space Train', and included a number of radical technological changes away from conventional rolling stock design. This would have substantially increased passenger capacity by doing away with internal carriage ends with articulation and the use of smaller wheels to reduce intrusion into the passenger area. Full scale technical models were made. However, the project was dropped when the PPP was instituted because the use of such radical technology introduced an element of risk that the private sector was not willing to bear. The changing nature of the PPP does mean that a new opportunity to explore the possibilities for new rolling stock on the Piccadilly and Bakerloo lines is now possible. London TravelWatch would therefore like to see a commitment by TfL / LUL / The Mayor to reopening the 'Space Train' project as this would give the possibility of creating a new tube train for London, along the same lines as the Mayor's commitment to a 'new bus for London'.
- 2.5.6 Experience of other metro systems responses to overcrowding. We are aware of a number of some other measures used elsewhere in the world, however, we suspect

that some of these may not be acceptable if used in London e.g. trains with no seats at all (India).

3 The upgrade programme

3.1 Our experience, particularly drawn from the casework we have received over many years is that as with overcrowding information is the key to passenger satisfaction when considering the impact of the upgrade programme. There is also a direct linkage with the issue of overcrowding in that without an upgrade programme the ability to tackle overcrowding is severely limited. Therefore, there is a finely balanced trade off between investing in facilities which are sufficient to meet peak demands for the future, and inconveniencing other passengers at less busy times in the present to enable the implementation of such investment.

3.2 Currently we receive very small volumes of correspondence regarding the upgrade programme and associated early and weekend closures / late openings on LU. The principle reason for this is that we made considerable representations to LU about improving communications with passengers regarding disruptions following on from the extensive Central closures that resulted from the Chancery Lane accident in 2003 (an unplanned closure), the closure of the East London Line in 2007 (a planned closure) and early experience of the upgrade programme. This resulted in a change of culture within LU such that early communication of, and the reasoning for closures, and information on alternative means of making journeys to passengers, now has a much higher profile (including budget) than previously.

3.2.1 London TravelWatch was also successful in persuading those managing the Thameslink upgrade programme to adopt similar methods in improving communications with passengers on the need for and consequences of those works.

3.3. LU has a dedicated staff team for managing and publicising closures on the Network. This team meets with London TravelWatch officers on a regular basis and also is responsible for co-ordination of works with the National Rail network (including Network Rail) and also with the organisers of major events (such as sport). (A description of how LU manages major closures operates is attached in the form of an article from Underground News).

3.4 In practise this means that the level of co-ordination has got significantly better in recent years, but there have been a number of significant occasions where this has not been seen to have worked well. There are number of reasons for this, some within the control of the rail industry and others not.

3.4.1 In some cases where the Underground and National Rail services share infrastructure closures have been / will be necessary to renew the infrastructure that both share e.g. renewing all points and main lines through Wimbledon station in 4 weekend possessions in April 2009.

3.4.2 In others contractual relationships between rail operators and with LU particularly where there is a question of who will pay the cost of providing alternative services, have sometimes caused decisions to be made which have not been in the passenger interest e.g. the Wimbledon possessions mentioned in 3.4.1 above Stagecoach South West Trains (SSWT) asked First Capital Connect (FCC) to provide additional services on its Wimbledon – London Bridge service, but this was refused after no agreement could be reached over who would fund the cost of the extra services: SSWT also declined to operate services over a diversionary route because that route is not normally used by them and would have required significant additional driver training. In the end following the intervention of London TravelWatch FCC did increase train lengths from the scheduled 4 car to 8 car for the duration of the works, but with a frequency of only 2

trains per hour compared to the normal 16 trains per hour of SSWT and the frequent service of the District Line, passengers travelling to central London were still subject to major inconvenience.

- 3.4.3 Major events planned at short notice can also have a considerable effect on the upgrade programme, because of the expectation that the transport network will respond to demand. However, in a number of instances due to the nature of the work required this may not be possible. Examples can include FA cup fixtures or where the timing of football league matches are determined by TV schedules.
- 3.5 Rail Replacement Bus services. In 2004 we published a report entitled 'When is a train not a train' on rail replacement bus services. This made a number of recommendations to improve the quality and planning of rail replacement bus services on both London Underground and National Rail services. There were two specific recommendations which are relevant to this scrutiny. Firstly, that station specific planning was needed to identify alternative routes available to passengers where they exist. Secondly, that consideration should be given to the scope for transferring passengers by bus to alternative lines, whether operated by the Underground or National Rail.
 - 3.5.1 Our experience over many years is that passengers prefer to use an alternative rail service (of whatever form) in preference to a bus replacement, because one of the principle reasons for choosing a rail mode (including the Underground) is the speed of the journey. Rail replacement buses which serve all stations on the line of a particular route tend to be slower than the equivalent rail journey because the road network is often significantly different to that of the railway. This means that many passengers will re-plan their journeys in such a way as to avoid the need to use a rail replacement bus. A good example is that of the closure of the East London Line, where four replacement bus routes following the line of route were introduced following this lines closure for upgrade in December 2007. Within weeks it was clear that large numbers of the lines' previous 37,000 passengers per day had chosen to use alternative Underground or National Rail lines or mainstream bus services rather than the rail replacement routes. As a consequence all of the routes were either; combined, reduced in frequency or in one case withdrawn completely and the resources released were reused on mainstream bus services in the area within a few months of the start of the original closure.
 - 3.5.2 In the Wimbledon example given previously rail replacement bus service not only ran to the next stations with available train services on the line of route but also the short distance to South Wimbledon Northern Line station.
- 4. The impact of both overcrowding and the upgrade programme on people with mobility difficulties.
 - 4.1 The Underground network at present is not a fully accessible system, and where full accessibility is available there are a limited number of journey possibilities that are realistically achievable. In addition overcrowding is in itself a major barrier to people with mobility difficulties using the Underground, because for example no seats are available, or it is difficult to manoeuvre in a crowd. The London Travel Report 2007 estimates that only 3% of journeys by Londoners who are either wheelchair users, or have a waking difficulty or some other disability are made by Underground. With such low levels of usage anyway, the impact of upgrade works on existing mobility impaired users could be said to be minimal. However, when upgrade works mean that the few accessible facilities are not available this can disproportionately affect on individuals who make use of these. In the particular the uneven spread of step free facilities e.g. the eastern ends of the Jubilee and District lines it is essential that replacement bus services for example are provided by fully accessible buses. For the most part LU uses fully accessible buses on this work.

- 4.2 Pressing forward with and completing the upgrade programme will be a major benefit to people with mobility difficulties, as well as giving substantial benefits to other travellers.
- 5. Conclusions
 - 5.1 London TravelWatch believes that although passengers accept that there will always be a degree of overcrowding and disruption services from time to time to maintain the system TfL / LU must as a first priority have a robust and effective programme of communications to enable passengers to make an informed choice for an alternative journey.
 - 5.2 Tackling overcrowding as an issue requires long term political and financial commitment by the Mayor / TfL / LU to:-
 - 5.2.1 upgrading the Underground and national rail networks including a reopening of the LUL 'Space Train' project for tube lines to create a new 'tube train for London'.
 - 5.2.2 upgrading and promoting the use of alternative modes such as parallel bus routes or in central London walking routes between Underground lines. It also requires attention to detail at an operations level to ensure that services run reliably.
 - 5.3 London TravelWatch believes that the Underground upgrade programme is a necessary and vital investment on behalf of passengers. It supports the extensive communications programme that LU has in place to keep passengers informed of the effects of this activity. However, it believes that there could be better co-operation from National Rail network operators in handling closures to avoid situations outlined in paragraph 3.4.2.

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